International trade is a long run issue -Paul
 Krugman (1996) 
But this long run is a misleading guide to current affairs. In the long run we are all dead. Economists set themselves too easy, too useless a task if in tempestuous seasons they can only tell us that when the storm is long past the ocean is flat again -Lord John
Maynard Keynes (1923) Why aren't we all Keynesians yet? -Paul Krugman (1998) The first quote from Paul Krugman represents the widespread view that most important international trade issues can best be understood by focusing on long-run relationships. Many of the assumptions that underlie the most influential model of trade -the Heckshcer-Ohlin-Samuelson (HOS) model -are clearly long-run in nature and it is understood that model's predictions are intended to describe long-run relationships. Over the years, there have been many attempts to broaden our scope and begin to take the short-run more seriously. The Specific Factors (SF) model is one such example. It replaces the HOS assumption of complete factor mobility with another extreme assumption -that some factors can only be employed in certain sectors. By now, the relationship between these two models is well known. Reallocating the mobile factors in the SF model allows one to trace out a short-run production possibilities frontier for each set of assumptions about factor mobility. The long-run production possibilities frontier of the HOS model is the outer-envelope of all of the short-run frontiers. Thus, the longrun behavior of the economy is just the natural extension of its short-run behavior.
In this paper, we provide a simple model of international trade with labor market turnover and examine its short run and long run behavior. The empirical relevance of labor market turnover has been widely documented over the past decade (see, for example, Davis, Haltiwanger and Schuh 1996) . Models that account for this phenomenon have become the norm in some sub-fields in economics, but not in international trade. We have argued elsewhere that the existence of labor market turnover forces us to modify many of the standard theorems in international economics (see, for example, Davidson, Martin and Matusz 1999) . In this paper, we argue that its presence makes the relationship between an economy's short-run and long-run behavior far more complex than it is in traditional trade models. For example, the economy's short-run production possibilities frontier may lie outside of its long run frontier. In addition, we show that emphasis on long-run relationships is misplaced and can lead one to draw faulty policy conclusions. Focusing on the short-run behavior of the economy restores sanity. The implication is that in the presence of labor market turnover international trade issues can only be understood by focusing on the entire dynamic path of the economy. Long-run relationships should be ignored.
The Model
Consider a continuous time model of a small open economy that produces two goods (x and y) with a single factor of production, labor. Workers are infinitely lived, derive utility from consumption and differ according to ability, with the ability level of worker i denoted by a i .
1 For simplicity, we assume that a i is uniformly distributed on [0, 1] and that the total measure of consumers is one.
The two sectors differ from each other in two dimensions. First, ability has a stronger influence on worker productivity in sector x than it does in sector y. The assumption that search is required to find employment is not essential to our analysis. It could easily be replaced by an assumption that workers must train for employment and that the flow of output produced while training is below the flow produced after training has been completed. All that is required is that there is a labor market state during which output is below its potential level and that there is some randomness in the rates at which workers enter and exit that state.
to denote the expected lifetime income for an employed worker with ability i a .
Analogously, ) ( i sx a V denotes the expected lifetime income for a worker with ability i a who is currently searching for a job in sector x. Then, for sector x workers we have the following asset value equations
In each equation, the first term on the right-hand-side is current income while the second term is the product of the capital gain (or loss) from changing labor market states and the rate at which such changes take place. For completeness, we include the final term, which is the derivative with respect to time of expected lifetime income. However, in our framework, expected lifetime income depends only on parameters of the model that are time invariant, and therefore these terms equal zero for all time. These equations can be solved to obtain . Therefore, 4 As we have already noted, all workers live forever in our model, so we are being loose with our use of the the worker's expected lifetime income is equal to a weighted average of what she earns
and what she earns while searching (zero). Because of discounting, the weight applied to the current activity is slightly higher than the weight applied to the future activity. As such, searchers place slightly greater weight on their current income of zero than on the positive income that they will earn once employed.
Similarly, employed workers place slightly greater weight on their positive income and discount the zero income that they will earn when they become unemployed.
In the market-induced steady state equilibrium, unemployed workers opt for spend only a fraction of their time employed and earning income, whereas workers in sector y are always employed. Indifference of the marginal worker implies that there has to be a payoff to waiting for a job in sector x. Because of this feature, we shall sometimes refer to sectors x and y as the high-wage and low-wage sectors, respectively.
term "lifetime". However, it is simpler to use the phrase "lifetime income" rather than the more cumbersome phrase "income discounted over the infinite future."
A diversified production equilibrium exists for a range of prices. 
In addition, in a steady-state equilibrium, the flow into sector x employment must equal the flow out of employment. Since
searchers find jobs and ( ) t bE x workers lose their jobs at each point in time, we must have
Given the equilibrium value of the ability of the marginal worker, we find the steady-state value of flow output (defined as ( ) m a I ; ∞ ) by integrating across ability: We use as our measure of social welfare the present discounted value of flow 
Long-Run Lunacy
Suppose that a social planner could allocate labor across sectors in a way to maximize the discounted steady state value of output. That is, suppose that a planner could choose the ability level of the marginal worker to maximize ( ) m a W as defined by (10). Substituting (9) into (10), it is a simple matter to deduce that the allocation of labor that maximizes the discounted steady-state value of output is attained when
where we have used the subscript "p" to indicate that this is the value that the planner would choose to maximize the value of steady state output. Evaluating both (4) and (11) at free-trade prices, it is evident that ft p a a < . That is, the discounted value of steadystate income is not maximized under free-trade. At the margin, moving some workers from the low-wage sector (where ability is not important) to the high-wage sector (where ability is important) increases the discounted value of steady-state output.
Armed with this information, it is easy to imagine a political pundit calling for an industrial policy aimed at expanding the high-wage sector. Many in the policy community have called for such a policy arguing that it is our interest to protect highwage jobs and expand sectors where ability is rewarded.
5 If we focus on the long run, it appears that this model provides support for such an argument. Of course, this argument ignores the role played by the short-run transitions between steady states. But, if trade is truly a long-run concern, perhaps these short-run costs should be ignored. Below, we argue that this is not the case.
To fix ideas, imagine that this economy is a net importer of good x, so that an industrial policy aimed at expanding this sector is equivalent to an import tariff. 
). Thus, the adjustment is gradual, and, if jobs in the import-competing sector are durable, it may take considerable time to approach the free trade steady-state equilibrium.
Aggregate flow-income (measured at world prices) during the adjustment to free trade is depicted in Figure 2 . Since searchers produce no output, the aggregate value of output jumps up immediately when they switch sectors, instantly becoming employed in qualitative results remain unchanged.
sector y. However, as time passes, the fact that the value of the output produced by these workers is less in the low-wage sector than they would have produced had they remained in the high-wage sector starts to weigh on the economy, and flow income starts to decrease. It continues to fall until it approaches its new (free trade) steady-state value.
Liberalization is optimal if the discounted value of aggregate flow-income along the adjustment path is greater than what could be earned by remaining in the tariff-distorted steady state. In the next section, we show that this is indeed the case, so that both arguments in favor of an industrial policy (both of which are based on long-run concerns) are flawed.
Short-Run Sanity
One of the advantages of a model as simple as ours is that it is possible to solve for the adjustment path across steady states and take this path into account when making welfare comparisons. Some additional notation will help in this regard. Equation (12) simply notes that the change in sector x employment equals the difference between the mass of workers who find jobs after searching and the mass of workers who lose their jobs. Equation (13) is an adding up constraint that follows from the fact that all movers are either employed or searching in sector x. Solving this system yields ( ) with (14) and (15) describing the evolution of employment in each sector.
We note also that, evaluated at world prices, the instantaneous value of output lost for each worker who exits the low-wage sector is y q , while the instantaneous value of output gained by the average worker moving into the high-wage sector is   
Proof: Substitute (14) into (20) and carry out the integration to obtain:
( ) ( ). Suppose, however, that policies have already been implemented to protect the high-wage sector. Or, alternatively, policies to protect that sector are given serious consideration as a way for the current generation (which bears all of the costs) to provide a benefit to future generations (who would appear to reap all of the benefits).
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Liberalizing trade would result in a decline in the long-run value of instantaneous output.
However, this would only occur after an initial burst of activity resulting in a spike in instantaneous output. This follows from the fact that some workers would cease searching for employment in the high-wage sector (where they are not producing anything) and immediately accept employment in the low-wage sector. In this case, Proof: In this case, workers are moving from the high-wage sector x to the low-wage sector y. Employment evolves according to (18) and (19). Substituting (18) into (23) and carrying out the integration yields: This means that in Figure 1 , the up-front loss in flow income is greater than any long-run benefit from expanding sector 2. It also means that in Figure 2 , the short-run increase in flow income that is triggered by liberalization swamps any long-run losses from expanding sector 1. Of course, this is what the vast majority of economists believe -free trade is always the best option -but when labor market turnover is present we only reach this conclusion when we focus on the short-run behavior of the economy and ignore its long-run properties.
Intuition
We now generalize our model in order to gain a deeper understanding of the relationship between the short and long run. Towards that end, we now assume that both sectors are characterized by job turnover, and that wages in both sectors are increasing in ability. Furthermore, we make no particular assumptions about the distribution of ability other than the normalization that
Given these assumptions, unemployed workers must choose a sector in which to search for a job. In an equilibrium with diversified production, the marginal worker is just indifferent between sectors. This means that the marginal level of ability is defined In equilibrium, these values are equated across sectors. This is no surprise.
Forward-looking agents choose the sector that generates the highest discounted value of wages (which reflect output), taking into account expected durations of employment and unemployment. Any movement away from the free-trade equilibrium breaks this equality (when evaluated at world prices) and reduces the discounted value of net output.
By contrast, the steady-state value of output is maximized when the steady-state values of the marginal products of labor are equated. The steady-state marginal product of labor for sector j, defined as the increase in the steady state value of good j given a small increase in the mass of workers in sector j is In general, using trade policy to protect the sector with the higher steady-state value of the marginal product of labor results in a higher steady-state value of output, but reduces the net discounted value of output. This can only happen if instantaneous output initially falls, which must indeed happen in this case. The negative welfare effects of this policy are clearly seen only by considering the short run.
It is also possible, of course, to fall prey to short-run lunacy. This could happen if a policy were implemented to provide protection to the sector with the lower steady-state marginal product of labor in the hopes of gaining a quick burst of output, delaying the ultimate costs (in the form of lower steady-state output) to the future. For example, returning to the parametric assumptions of Section 3, providing protection to sector y (in this case an export subsidy) would cause an immediate expansion in this sector and consequent increase in the value of output. Ultimately, however, the instantaneous value of output must fall as some workers who lose their high-wage jobs take low-wage jobs rather than return to searching in sector x. However, we know that movement away from the free-trade equilibrium necessitates a reduction in the net discounted value of output.
The short run-gain is not enough to overcome the long-run pain.
Production Possibilities Versus Sustainable Production
We are certainly not the first to explore the relationship between the short-run and long-run in the context of a general equilibrium model of trade. Seminal papers by Jones (1971), Mayer (1974) , Mussa (1974) , and Neary (1978) have all enriched our understanding of this connection. We argue here, however, that there is a distinct difference between our approach and the approach taken by others. In the standard approach, exemplified by Mayer (1974) , it is assumed that some factor of production (say capital) is immobile in the short run, but then gradually moves between sectors in response to a differential in the rental rate. Ultimately, the allocation of capital reaches its long-run equilibrium when the rental rate (and therefore the marginal product of capital) is the same in both sectors. As Mayer shows, this sort of analysis leads to a longrun production possibilities frontier that is the outer envelope of a family of short-run frontiers, each of which is parameterized by a particular short-run allocation of capital.
The key point is that the value output in the short run can never be higher than in the long run. This result is clearly at odds with our formulation.
In order to illustrate the difference between sustainable production and production possibilities, we return to the specialized model of earlier sections. Define
as the aggregate quantity of output produced in sector j at time t. Using our earlier notation,
, the steady state level of output in sector j. Multiplying total steadystate employment by average worker productivity in each sector, sustainable production levels are defined by (27) and (28):
Simple substitution of (27) into (28) shows that the set of outputs that are sustainable in a steady state form a negatively sloped, concave curve, as illustrated in Figure 3 . This is the analogue of the textbook production possibilities curve. However, we have already seen that the quantity of output in one sector or the other could temporarily exceed (or fall short of) its long run value.
In Figure 3 , the lines points labeled Starting from the tariff-distorted steady state, removal of the tariff causes an immediate increase in the production of y (with no corresponding reduction in x) as searchers exit sector x, followed by a further gradual increase in y and reduction in x. As with Figure 2 , the value of output expands in the short run, and this is enough to outweigh the lower value of output produced in the steady state.
While we have drawn Figure Early in our careers a senior colleague warned us that many people read just the introduction and conclusion of papers, figuring that all the essential information is contained in those two sections. Much of the analysis in international trade has followed a similar approach by focusing only on the initial and final equilibria without paying sufficient attention to the manner in which the economy goes from one steady state to another. The purpose of this paper has been to point out that if one just compares long run steady state equilibria they may be led to draw invalid conclusions. To see how we make this point, you will have to read the intermediate 
